Epistemology and ontology, interpretivism and symbolic interactionism

Qualitative research doesn’t run on “neutral” assumptions—assumptions quietly steer what researchers look for, how they interpret evidence, and which kinds of knowledge they treat as credible. The core practical point is that assumptions act like a guide: they shape the boundaries of a study before data collection begins, including what counts as relevant leadership, who might display it, and what kinds of explanations feel plausible.

A concrete example centers on researching leadership behaviors in classrooms. At the outset, researchers face a choice: assume leadership is mainly performed by teachers, or allow that students may also lead within peer groups. Existing literature can resolve that dilemma by showing that leadership can come from multiple sources—sometimes teachers lead, sometimes children do. Even then, researchers must keep room for the unexpected possibility that, in some classrooms, no leadership-like behavior appears. The takeaway is not that assumptions should be eliminated, but that they should be made deliberate, informed by prior knowledge, and flexible enough to accommodate surprises.

The discussion then shifts from everyday assumptions to two foundational philosophical lenses that organize qualitative inquiry: epistemology and ontology. Epistemology concerns how knowledge is obtained—how people come to know the world—while ontology concerns what kind of world is assumed to exist and be knowable. These frameworks matter because they determine what researchers treat as the “starting point” for knowledge claims.

Interpretivism is presented as a major qualitative framing tied to the idea that people naturally interpret what they sense. Under this view, interpretations are the point of departure for coming to know. That contrasts with realist preferences for observing reality in a relatively value-free way, often relying on the correspondence between ideas and experiences. In practice, interpretivist research tends to treat participants’ shared interpretations—along with researchers’ own interpretive engagement with experiences—as primary data. Instead of counting or matching mathematical structures to experience, interpretivist qualitative work leans on meaning-making through dialogue, reflection, and engagement with evidence.

Symbolic interactionism offers a second set of assumptions about knowledge and meaning. It rests on two principles: people act toward things based on the meanings those things hold for them, and those meanings are derived from social interaction and can change through interpretation. The lens is illustrated through how people come to understand concepts like mathematics—knowledge is not only learned as definitions, but absorbed through socialization in settings such as classrooms. This view can clash with quantitative ideals of replicable measurement, because meanings attached to measurements can shift across people. Yet the tension is partly managed by recognizing that quantitative measurement is often taught in standardized ways, even while higher-level interpretations in discussion sections can diverge.

Overall, the argument ties together: qualitative research depends on explicit philosophical assumptions about knowing and meaning. Interpretivism prioritizes trust in human interpretation as evidence; symbolic interactionism emphasizes how meanings develop socially and remain open to modification—both shaping what counts as knowledge in qualitative studies and why those choices matter for credibility and interpretation.