he hacked my websites
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Hard-coded API keys in front-end code are a high-impact vulnerability because they enable direct abuse of third-party services and can bypass server-side protections.
Briefing
A fast, automated-and-manual pen test of 24 newly built websites turned up a pattern: many “low priority” misconfigurations and exposed details can still cascade into real risk—especially when API keys, WordPress defaults, and client-side secrets are left in the open. The work matters because it shows how quickly an attacker can enumerate targets, fingerprint stacks, and then pivot from harmless-looking findings (headers, missing protections, version leaks) into higher-impact abuse (credential guessing, data exposure, denial of service, and XSS).
The testing began with Nickto (Nick Toe), a command-line scanner aimed at fingerprinting the server and hunting for known weaknesses like outdated versions. It struggled enough with TLS to terminate with errors, so the results were fed into an LLM (Claude) along with the site code and a vulnerability list. That AI-assisted pass produced practical fixes—such as adding missing security headers—and flagged a major issue: API keys were hard-coded directly into the front-end. Because the hosting provider handled server-side concerns, most findings were low severity, but the exposed keys were a clear, high-value target.
Next came OWASP ZAP, run in a proxy-based workflow that lets the tester browse the site while ZAP watches requests and responses. With the site explicitly added to scope, ZAP reported medium alerts and at least one anti-clickjacking-related issue. An automated active scan completed without high-severity server-side problems, and the tester then inspected the source directly to confirm what was and wasn’t in scope.
Burp Suite Pro added a more “professional” layer: deep web app scanning with checks for SQL injection, JavaScript analysis, and static application security testing-style techniques. Burp quickly surfaced a high-severity problem tied to a vulnerable Axios JavaScript library version. After updating the script source and re-scanning, the vulnerability disappeared—an example of how dependency hygiene can be the difference between “informational” and “exploitable.”
WordPress sites were tested with WPScan and Burp’s WordPress-oriented features. Findings included version disclosure (e.g., PHP 8.2.16), exposed WordPress defaults like readme files, and login behavior that enabled username enumeration. The tester emphasized that WordPress admin endpoints should be IP-restricted to prevent brute-force and enumeration.
The most damaging pivot came from exposed API keys and weak rate limiting. One endpoint accepted an API key passed in the URL; without rate limits, the tester demonstrated how repeated requests could spam the API and degrade availability—an availability attack aligned with the CIA triad’s “A.” Another site exposed environment variables, including a database password, and an admin interface that could be accessed with guessed credentials (admin/admin). Finally, client-side weaknesses showed up in a “countdown” page: manipulating JavaScript-controlled state unlocked a secret, and an open redirect pattern was demonstrated as a stepping stone to phishing and, in some cases, reflected XSS.
Overall, the exercise blended tooling (Nickto, OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite Pro, WPScan, SAST via GitHub integration, and auxiliary recon tools) with disciplined scoping and rapid iteration. The takeaway is blunt: even when scanners report “medium” or “low,” exposed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, and client-side trust gaps can still turn a hobby project into an attacker’s shortcut.
Cornell Notes
A pen test of 24 recently created websites found that security failures often start with reconnaissance and “small” misconfigurations, then escalate through exposed secrets and weak controls. Automated scanning tools (Nickto, OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite Pro, WPScan) quickly fingerprinted stacks, flagged missing protections, and identified dependency issues like a vulnerable Axios version. The most serious risks came from hard-coded API keys, WordPress information leakage (version/default files), and endpoints that allowed abuse—such as API-key-in-URL requests without rate limiting, enabling denial-of-service. The testing also demonstrated environment variable exposure and client-side JavaScript manipulation that could unlock hidden content. The lesson: treat exposed details and client-side trust as high-risk even when initial alerts look minor.
Why did the testing pivot from Nickto to an LLM-assisted workflow?
How did OWASP ZAP’s proxy workflow help find issues that automated scans might miss?
What made Burp Suite Pro’s findings more “exploit-ready” than earlier results?
What WordPress-specific weaknesses were highlighted as common attacker leverage points?
How can an exposed API key lead to denial-of-service even without “hacking” the server?
What did the testing reveal about client-side secrets and JavaScript trust?
Review Questions
- Which specific categories of findings were most likely to escalate from “low/medium alerts” into real attacker impact, and why?
- How do scope and permission boundaries change what tools like ZAP can legally and ethically do during testing?
- What controls would most directly mitigate the demonstrated API-key abuse and WordPress enumeration risks?
Key Points
- 1
Hard-coded API keys in front-end code are a high-impact vulnerability because they enable direct abuse of third-party services and can bypass server-side protections.
- 2
Dependency scanning matters: Burp Suite Pro identified a high-severity vulnerable Axios version, and updating the script source eliminated the issue on re-scan.
- 3
Recon and fingerprinting quickly narrow the attack surface; TLS/version disclosure and exposed defaults (like WordPress readme files) help attackers target the right exploits.
- 4
WordPress login endpoints should be IP allow-listed to prevent username enumeration and brute-force attempts.
- 5
Rate limiting is essential for endpoints that accept API keys (especially when keys are passed in URLs), since weak controls enable denial-of-service via request spamming.
- 6
Client-side secrets and JavaScript-controlled logic are not trustworthy; attackers can manipulate browser state to unlock hidden content.
- 7
Even “informational” findings can become actionable when combined with exposed secrets, weak input handling, or unsafe URL behaviors (open redirects/XSS patterns).