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I'm so Sick of this Lazy Excuse (for bad cities) thumbnail

I'm so Sick of this Lazy Excuse (for bad cities)

Not Just Bikes·
6 min read

Based on Not Just Bikes's video on YouTube. If you like this content, support the original creators by watching, liking and subscribing to their content.

TL;DR

Weather severity is treated as a weak predictor of urban performance compared with safety, infrastructure quality, land use, and transit reliability.

Briefing

Weather is a lazy excuse for bad city design—and the evidence points to infrastructure, land use, and safety as the real drivers of whether people walk, cycle, and use transit. The core claim is straightforward: there’s little correlation between how harsh a city’s weather is and how well it functions for daily travel. When cities fail to deliver safe streets, reliable transit, and walkable destinations, “rain” or “snow” becomes a convenient distraction rather than a genuine constraint.

Copenhagen’s experience is used as the flagship counterexample. In the early 1960s, the city moved to remove cars from a street despite frequent dark, cold, rainy days and winter snow. Shopkeepers warned the plan would collapse their business, and critics leaned on cultural arguments too. Yet the car-free street became a major success in 1962, with shops and restaurants thriving and the model spreading to other pedestrianized streets. The adaptation wasn’t denial of weather; it was practical comfort—heaters and blankets at outdoor cafés—paired with a street embedded in a dense, mixed-use, transit-accessible area.

Fresno, California offers a cautionary parallel. The city pedestrianized a street in 1964 and reopened it as the Fulton Street Mall, initially benefiting from warm, sunny conditions. But over time, more stores closed and the street struggled until cars were reintroduced in 2017. The explanation centers on access and context: a pedestrian street that most people still have to drive to will underperform, regardless of sunshine. By then, Fresno had widened roads for cars, demolished buildings for parking, underfunded transit, and shifted most arrivals to driving—turning the mall into a destination that required car-based logistics.

The argument broadens beyond single case studies to cycling and comparative climate. Fresno’s bicycle mode share is described as under 2% of trips, while Copenhagen is portrayed as among the world’s best for cycling, supported by extensive protected bike lanes. Even the Netherlands—where cycling is extremely high—faces frequent rain and recurring severe wind events, yet people still ride. The transcript also cites a study of 90 American cities finding that precipitation and counts of hot/cold days don’t statistically predict bike commuting in large cities. Weather can influence comfort and timing, but safety, sprawl, mixed-use zoning, parking policy, and infrastructure quality dominate outcomes.

A major theme is that weather affects behavior through adaptation and infrastructure, not through inevitability. People delay trips when rain is coming, change travel times using weather apps, and rely on clothing and equipment designed for wet conditions. Cultural norms—like the idea that you’re not “made of sugar” and won’t melt in the rain—support consistent cycling. Meanwhile, infrastructure quality determines whether bad weather becomes a deal-breaker: Amsterdam’s protected lanes and rapid snow clearing contrast with Toronto’s inconsistent bike network and dangerous interactions with speeding drivers.

The transcript also tackles “hot weather” excuses. It argues that car-centric design worsens heat via asphalt heat storage, vehicle heat, and urban heat island effects. Examples include Seoul replacing an elevated freeway with a stream, reducing heat island temperatures. The takeaway is that weather should be treated as an engineering variable—shade, sheltered transit stops, cleared bike lanes, and signal timing—not as a reason to avoid building cities that prioritize people over cars.

Cornell Notes

Weather is repeatedly framed as a weak predictor of whether urban improvements succeed. Copenhagen’s 1962 car-free street succeeded despite cold, rain, and snow, while Fresno’s pedestrian mall later declined and reopened to cars—less because of weather than because car-oriented access, widened roads, parking expansion, and underfunded transit undermined foot traffic. Across cycling comparisons, high- and low-cycling cities can share similar climates, and a cited study of 90 American cities found precipitation and hot/cold day counts weren’t statistically significant predictors of bike commuting. The transcript argues that infrastructure (protected lanes, snow clearing, safe street design), land use (mixed-use, compact destinations), and policy (parking and transit quality) matter more, while weather influences comfort and timing that can be managed with design and adaptation.

Why does the transcript treat “bad weather” as a distraction rather than a real constraint?

It claims there’s little correlation between local weather severity and how well cities work for walking, cycling, and transit. Weather may change how many people go out and when they travel, but outcomes are dominated by safety, street design, mixed-use zoning, parking policy, and transit reliability. The argument is illustrated by car-free and cycling examples where harsh conditions didn’t prevent success once streets were designed for people.

What happened in Copenhagen, and why is it used as a counterexample?

In 1962, Copenhagen removed cars from a street despite frequent dark, cold, rainy days, winter snow, and shopkeeper fears that customers couldn’t arrive by car. Critics also argued it conflicted with Danish culture. The plan proceeded anyway and became a major success: shops and restaurants stayed in demand and the model spread, with outdoor comfort solutions like café heaters and blankets helping people adapt.

How does Fresno’s Fulton Street Mall illustrate the limits of pedestrianization without access?

Fresno closed the street to cars in 1964 and reopened it as the Fulton Street Mall, initially aided by generally warm, sunny conditions. Over time, more stores closed and the street struggled until cars returned in 2017. The transcript attributes the decline to context: by then, roads were widened for cars, buildings were demolished for parking, transit was unreliable, and most people arrived by car—so a pedestrian street that still depends on driving to reach it won’t sustain demand.

What does the transcript claim about cycling and weather in the Netherlands versus North America?

The Netherlands is described as having frequent rain and recurring severe wind events, yet cycling remains high because it’s often the fastest, cheapest, and most convenient option. The transcript contrasts this with North American cities where cycling rates are low (e.g., Fresno under 2% of trips by bike) due to unsafe, inconsistent infrastructure and car-dominated street design. It also notes that people may delay trips during rain rather than stop cycling entirely.

How do infrastructure and maintenance change the weather experience for cyclists?

Amsterdam is portrayed as consistently safe for cycling because protected bike lanes exist on major roads, routes are separated from car traffic, and bike lanes are cleared quickly when snow occurs. Toronto is portrayed as having lower-quality and inconsistent bike infrastructure, including streets with no bike facilities and drivers speeding on residential roads—making dark, rainy, or icy conditions far more dangerous. The transcript’s point: weather becomes decisive when the street environment is already risky.

What is the transcript’s explanation for differences in how people respond to cold or snow across regions?

It argues people acclimate to the weather they regularly experience, so travel patterns shift mainly during extreme events outside the local norm. It cites a study comparing the Netherlands (Utrecht) with cities in Norway and Sweden, noting that Utrecht travelers shortened distances when it snowed, while Oslo and Stockholm did not—because snow is routine in the latter places. It also adds that extreme changes, not typical seasonal conditions, drive major behavioral shifts.

Review Questions

  1. Which urban factors does the transcript rank as more important than weather for walking and cycling outcomes, and how are they demonstrated in the Copenhagen/Fresno comparison?
  2. How does the transcript distinguish between weather affecting trip timing versus determining whether cycling is possible at all?
  3. What role does infrastructure maintenance (like snow clearing and protected lanes) play in turning bad weather into a manageable condition rather than an excuse for inaction?

Key Points

  1. 1

    Weather severity is treated as a weak predictor of urban performance compared with safety, infrastructure quality, land use, and transit reliability.

  2. 2

    Copenhagen’s 1962 car-free street succeeded despite cold, rain, and snow because the street was embedded in a dense, mixed-use, transit-accessible area and comfort adaptations followed.

  3. 3

    Fresno’s Fulton Street Mall declined and later reopened to cars because pedestrian access was undermined by car-oriented road widening, parking expansion, demolished downtown buildings, and underfunded transit.

  4. 4

    Cycling rates are linked more to protected, connected bike networks than to climate; the transcript cites a study of 90 American cities where precipitation and hot/cold day counts weren’t significant predictors of bike commuting.

  5. 5

    Even in the Netherlands—despite frequent rain and very windy conditions—cycling remains high because it’s often the fastest and most convenient option and because people adapt with clothing and trip timing.

  6. 6

    Bad-weather cycling becomes safer and more feasible when cities provide protected lanes, clear them quickly, and reduce dangerous car-bike interactions.

  7. 7

    Hot-weather excuses are challenged by pointing to car-centric heat drivers (asphalt heat storage, vehicle heat, and urban heat island effects) and by citing heat-reducing urban redesign like Seoul’s freeway-to-stream replacement.

Highlights

Copenhagen’s car-free street launched in 1962 despite winter snow and frequent cold rain—and it became a commercial success, with cafés later adding heaters and blankets.
Fresno’s pedestrian mall opened in 1964 but struggled until cars returned in 2017; the transcript pins the decline on car-dependent access and weakened transit, not on sunshine levels.
A cited study of 90 American cities found precipitation and counts of cold/hot days don’t statistically predict bike commuting in large cities.
Amsterdam is portrayed as reliably safe for cycling in dark, rainy conditions due to protected lanes and quick snow clearing, while Toronto’s inconsistent infrastructure makes the same weather far more dangerous.
The Netherlands is used to show that rain and high winds don’t prevent cycling when streets are designed for people and riders adapt with gear and timing.

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