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Is The Future Predetermined By Quantum Mechanics?

PBS Space Time·
6 min read

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TL;DR

Relativity makes the “present” a relative space-time slice, not a universal instant, which already weakens the idea that only one moment truly exists.

Briefing

Quantum mechanics and relativity collide on a single question: does the universe leave room for an open future, or does the future already sit fixed inside a “block” of space-time? Relativity’s block-universe picture treats past, present, and future as parts of one four-dimensional whole, with the “present” depending on an observer’s motion. That already undermines any universal, absolute now. The missing ingredient is quantum theory—specifically what happens when an indeterminate quantum state becomes the definite outcomes that macroscopic life experiences.

In quantum mechanics, systems are described by a wave function that encodes probabilities across many possible states. The key puzzle is the transition from that probabilistic, “undefined” quantum regime to the single, concrete reality that people observe. The Copenhagen interpretation answers with collapse: the wave function stays undefined until measurement, when it randomly selects one outcome from the probability distribution. That randomness looks like genuine indeterminism, but it creates trouble when combined with relativity’s lack of an absolute past. If collapse happens whenever an observer measures, then different observers—whose definitions of “present” differ—could in principle collapse the same universal wave function in ways that would erase the possibility of an uncollapsed future for someone else. To keep a future genuinely undefined in Copenhagen-style collapse, the framework effectively requires that only one privileged observer performs the collapsing, a condition most physicists do not find natural.

The many-worlds interpretation sidesteps collapse. The wave function never collapses; instead, it evolves deterministically while outcomes branch into multiple non-communicating realities. When relativity’s light-cone structure is brought in, branching can be pictured as spreading correlations: entanglement webs propagate through space-time, and decoherence explains why those webs behave like effectively separate “worlds” at macroscopic scales. Quantum Darwinism and decoherence don’t produce clean, isolated alternative universes; they produce a tangled network of correlated sub-realities. As an observer’s light cone advances, they encounter and become correlated with one set of entanglement networks, while other versions of “you” correlate with other networks. The evolution remains deterministic, but personal experience of which branch is “yours” is not something the theory lets you predict.

So does the future already exist? Under many-worlds plus decoherence, the wave function’s evolution is fixed, meaning future branching is predetermined in the global description; what remains open is the observer’s subjective experience of which branch they inhabit. Under Copenhagen, the future can be genuinely indeterminate—but only at the cost of a collapse mechanism that struggles to stay consistent with relativity when multiple observers exist. The upshot is that “predestination” depends less on physics alone and more on which interpretation of quantum mechanics one adopts.

The discussion also returns to relativity’s relativity of simultaneity and the philosophical tension between eternalism (all slices of space-time exist) and presentism (only the present exists). Relativity doesn’t make simultaneity meaningless; it makes it observer-dependent. What it challenges is the idea that one observer’s slice of “now” uniquely exists to the exclusion of other slices. If consciousness is treated as emergent from brain dynamics—spanning at least tens to hundreds of milliseconds—then “the present” likely has a finite duration rather than a mathematically instantaneous moment. The overall conclusion: relativity pushes toward a block-like ontology, quantum theory determines whether that block contains real indeterminism or only deterministic branching with subjective uncertainty.

Cornell Notes

Relativity treats the “present” as observer-dependent, fitting naturally with a block universe where past and future are already part of one space-time structure. Quantum mechanics adds a second layer: systems evolve as wave functions encoding probabilities, and interpretations differ on whether a single outcome is produced by collapse (Copenhagen) or by deterministic branching (many worlds). Copenhagen’s random collapse can make the future genuinely undefined, but it clashes with relativity’s lack of an absolute past when multiple observers are allowed to collapse the same universal wave function. Many worlds keeps evolution deterministic and uses decoherence (and related ideas like quantum Darwinism) to explain why observers experience one branch. The result: the global future may be fixed, while which branch an observer experiences can still feel unpredictable.

How does the block-universe idea from relativity affect the meaning of “now”?

Relativity ties space and time together, so “present” becomes a slice through space-time rather than a universal instant. Different observers moving at different velocities slice the block at different angles, so what counts as an observer’s future can be another observer’s past. The key point is that relativity doesn’t erase the ability to define simultaneity maps; it makes those maps depend on the observer. What it undermines is the claim that one particular slice uniquely exists while other slices do not.

What problem does quantum mechanics raise for determinism when combined with relativity?

Quantum theory describes many physical systems with a wave function that evolves into probabilities over possible states. The central issue is how a single macroscopic outcome emerges from that indeterminate description. Copenhagen says the wave function collapses into one definite result at measurement, introducing fundamental randomness. Many worlds says there is no collapse; instead, all outcomes persist as branches. Relativity complicates Copenhagen because different observers have different “presents,” so collapse events tied to observation can’t be cleanly assigned without an absolute notion of past and present.

Why does Copenhagen-style collapse struggle to keep an uncollapsed future for an observer?

If collapse happens when other observers measure, then an observer’s “future” light cone might already lie in another observer’s past light cone, meaning the universal wave function could be collapsed in regions that the first observer hasn’t reached yet. Since relativity prevents a single absolute past, there’s no straightforward way to prevent those collapses from affecting what counts as still “undefined” for someone else. The only coherent way to preserve an uncollapsed future in this picture is effectively to treat the observer as the only one performing the collapse, which is not a natural fit for a universe with many observers.

How does many-worlds use entanglement and decoherence to connect branching with relativity’s light-cone structure?

Many worlds replaces collapse with deterministic evolution of the global wave function. Branching can be pictured as correlations spreading through space-time, constrained by how quantum correlations are transferred—light-speed signaling is the reliable way to move correlations. Decoherence explains why macroscopic systems behave as if they occupy separate outcomes: as systems become more complex, entanglement with the environment suppresses interference between different components of the wave function. The result is not a neat set of isolated alternate universes but a tangled network of entanglement webs; observers become correlated with one web as their light cone advances.

What does “determinism” mean in many-worlds for an individual observer?

The wave function’s evolution is deterministic, so the future branching structure is fixed in the global description. However, an observer’s subjective experience is tied to the particular entanglement network they are correlated with. Each version of the observer experiences only one branch, so personal uncertainty remains even though the underlying dynamics are not random. In this sense, the theory can make the global future predetermined while the experienced future is not predictable from the observer’s standpoint.

Review Questions

  1. If two observers moving relative to each other disagree on what counts as “present,” what does that imply about any attempt to define a unique, globally existing now?
  2. Compare Copenhagen and many-worlds on what happens to the wave function at measurement. How does each interpretation handle randomness and determinism?
  3. In the many-worlds plus decoherence picture, why does an observer experience only one outcome even though the wave function evolves deterministically?

Key Points

  1. 1

    Relativity makes the “present” a relative space-time slice, not a universal instant, which already weakens the idea that only one moment truly exists.

  2. 2

    Quantum mechanics describes systems with wave functions that encode probability distributions, raising the question of how a single definite outcome emerges.

  3. 3

    Copenhagen introduces real randomness via wave-function collapse at measurement, but that collapse mechanism becomes difficult to reconcile with relativity when multiple observers exist.

  4. 4

    Many worlds keeps the wave function evolution deterministic by eliminating collapse and treating outcomes as branching realities.

  5. 5

    Decoherence (and related ideas like quantum Darwinism) explains why macroscopic observers experience effectively separate outcomes as entanglement with the environment suppresses interference.

  6. 6

    In many worlds, the global future branching can be predetermined while an individual observer’s experienced branch remains effectively unpredictable.

  7. 7

    The eternalism vs presentism debate is sharpened by relativity: observer-dependent simultaneity undermines the coherence of a single uniquely existing “now.”

Highlights

Relativity turns “now” into an observer-dependent slice through space-time, so different observers can treat the same events as past or future.
Copenhagen’s collapse can make the future genuinely undefined, but multiple observers with different “presents” create a consistency problem for keeping someone else’s future uncollapsed.
Many worlds replaces randomness with deterministic evolution, using decoherence to explain why observers experience one branch.
The discussion frames determinism as global (wave-function evolution) versus subjective (which branch an observer experiences).

Mentioned