Why People Aren’t Having Kids & How To Fix It

Fertility rates in much of the industrialized world have fallen to levels that governments can’t easily reverse—cash incentives can nudge birth rates upward, but the gains tend to be small and temporary. In the US, the average number of children per woman hit an all-time low in 2023 (1.79 in 2024, still below the replacement level of about 2.1). A Pew Research Center report adds urgency: among US adults under 50 who are childless, 47% say they’re unlikely to have kids, and among those, 57% say the reason is simply that they “just don’t want to.”

That mix—low desire to have children plus persistent declines across industrialized countries—has fueled political debate and a pronatalist push. Explanations range from cultural shifts (later childbearing, more work for women, lifestyle preferences) to technology and social media, with TikTok often blamed. Economic obstacles are one of the most supported theories, partly because many countries show a “fertility gap”: couples report wanting more children than they actually have. Yet even places with strong parental support—Northern Europe with maternity leave and state-subsidized childcare—still show low fertility, suggesting no single lever can solve the problem.

Governments have tried a variety of pronatalist policies, from direct payments to tax breaks and expanded services. Italy and Greece offer bonuses per baby; Hungary increases payments with each additional child, reaching up to 30,000 euro for families with at least three. Taiwan provides tax cuts and even “free pets,” while Denmark has urged citizens to have more children. A recent review of past research finds the most consistently effective initiatives are cash benefits—birth payments or tax exemptions—alongside paid leave and childcare coverage. The catch is magnitude: measurable effects exist, but they’re small.

The clearest example comes from Australia’s large birth bonus. A 3,000-dollar payment was later raised to 5,000, temporarily lifting the fertility rate from about 1.76 to 2.02. Once the bonus ended in 2013, fertility fell again. France combined a smaller baby bonus (around 1,000 euro) with additional support for the first year and childcare coverage up to age 2, and that package appears to have helped. Hungary’s bonus also raised fertility, but again only modestly.

The broader takeaway is that money can matter, but it doesn’t override deeper uncertainty. The proposed driver is insecurity about the future: young people may be reluctant to have children when they don’t trust conditions will improve. The practical implication is straightforward—if societies want higher birth rates, they need to reduce the anxieties that make parenthood feel risky. Otherwise, the policy toolbox may keep producing short-lived bumps rather than lasting change.